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Director’s Note
Hospital-Based Health Care Systems in Transition: The
Post-BBA Era summarizes impressions of a two-day workshop in Annapolis, Maryland, and three small-group site visits
that preceded it. Designed to look at the far-reaching changes
enacted under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and
how they would play out across the health delivery system,
the exercise grew out of discussions with the National Health
Policy Forum’s Private Market Technical Advisory Group
(TAG). It brought together a range of federal policymakers
and hospital-based system executives to share their perspectives on the outlook for operating in the post-BBA era. While
initially intended to look at impacts on many kinds of institutions, the workshop focused on hospital-based systems but
attempted to incorporate attention to post-acute needs and
services across the continuum of care.
As this project took shape, the policy environment was
shifting considerably. Rapidly rising Medicare costs and
major budget deficits that had given rise to the BBA already belonged to the past, replaced by unprecedented
reductions in Medicare outlays and rapidly increasing budget surpluses. And there was disagreement about the reasons for such a turnaround in expenditures, with questions being raised about the extent to which increased fraud
and abuse surveillance and overall belt-tightening in light
of managed care pressures might be at work. Against this
backdrop, examining the effects of the BBA turned out to
be a difficult task, because the data are incomplete and
conflicting on what actually has occurred. Also, because
implementation of the BBA extends through 2001, some
of its effects have yet to be experienced.
By the time of the workshop, congressional staff members were still quite mindful of the budget pressures their
bosses had been under and the specific objectives they wanted
the BBA to achieve, while interest groups were intent on
“givebacks” that would alleviate the legislation’s impact.
Comments received after the workshop indicated equally
mixed emotions because many of the disruptions and inequities felt by various players—and explored at the workshop—had been swept under the rug as election-year politics made across-the-board restoration of funds likely. It was
noted, however, that at some point a variety of issues such as
the stability of safety net functions and the support for graduate medical education will need to be addressed, with further analysis required before meaningful action can be taken.
This report takes these factors into account. It was authored
by the three NHPF staff members who developed the project.
Nora Super Jones, senior research associate and coordinator
of the project, contributed the “Origin and Description” and
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Bon Secours section. Lisa Sprague, senior research associate, prepared the Henry Ford Health System (HFHS) portion. Karen Matherlee, co-director, supplied the University
of Washington Academic Medical Center (UW AMC) section and wrote the “Overall Perspectives” of the Annapolis
conference.
In doing so, the three drew upon the contributions of
numerous people. Thanking them all would be a document in itself. Joeann Karibo, director of community commitment, and Everard Rutledge, Ph.D., vice president of
community health, Bon Secours, were instrumental to the
organization and conduct of the Bon Secours site visit.
Gail Warden, president and chief executive officer of
HFHS and a member of the Private Market TAG, was the
force behind the Detroit site visit and, indeed, of this BBA
project itself. He was ably assisted by Darlene Burgess,
vice president, government affairs, for HFHS. Aaron Katz,
director of UW’s Health Policy Analysis Program; Bruce
Ferguson, assistant vice president for planning in the UW
AMC School of Medicine; and Elise Chayet, director of
planning and regulatory affairs at Harborview Medical
Center, as well as John Coombs, M.D., associate vice
president and associate dean of the UW School of Medicine, were key advisors and contributors to the Seattle
site visit.
Sheila Burke, at the time associate dean of the Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, and Linda
Bilheimer, senior program officer, Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, served as moderators at the Annapolis conference and gave generously of their expertise. Julie James, a
principal at Health Policy Alternatives; William Scanlon,
Ph.D., director of health financing and public health issues
at the General Accounting Office; and William Vaughan,
minority professional staff member of the House Ways and
Means health subcommittee, were extremely helpful in organizing the Annapolis meeting. Julie James, Linda
Bilheimer, and Bill Scanlon, along with Katharine Levit of
the Health Care Financing Administration and Sibyl Tilson
of the Congressional Research Service, reviewed and made
invaluable suggestions for this report. The responsibility for
the report’s contents, however, belongs to NHPF.
With deep thanks to all who participated in this project,
NHPF looks forward to tackling the research agenda that
resulted, with the help of the dedicated corps of people who
appear on this page and those that follow.
Judith Miller Jones, Director
July 2000

Origin and Description of the
Project
In the last decade, the health care marketplace has
undergone dramatic change, fundamentally altering how and
where care is delivered, how providers are organized and
operate, as well as how care is financed by both private and
public sources. Hospitals—traditionally the bedrock of the
health care system—have developed new ways of doing
business to respond to this changing environment. Many
hospital-based systems have moved to integrate care across
delivery sites, forging new relationships with physicians,
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), home health agencies, and
other parts of the health care delivery system. Others have
consolidated and merged operations to respond to competitive pressures. Changing payment structures and incentives
have made it more challenging for hospitals to continue to
fulfill historical social missions such as providing care to the
poor, training new medical professionals, and conducting
clinical research.
In the midst of these challenges, Congress enacted the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), which contained
numerous changes to the Medicare program as well as
other health provisions. These include some changes in
Medicaid plus new State Children’s Health Insurance
Program and Medicare+Choice initiatives. Designed
primarily to balance the federal budget, the act significantly reduced projected federal spending on the Medicare
program. A majority of these savings result from slowing
the rate of growth in payments to hospitals, physicians, and
other providers. A second major source of savings comes
from new payment methodologies for SNFs, home health
agencies, rehabilitation hospitals, and outpatient services—sectors that many hospital-based systems had
expanded prior to the BBA.

brought about by other factors. Because Medicare accounts
for about 40 percent of the income of the average U.S.
hospital, BBA payment reductions were bound to have an
impact on hospitals’ bottom lines. The extent of the impact
seems to be the result of a variety of factors, including level
of integration and range of services provided, service area
location, breakdown of funding sources (Medicare, Medicaid, private, and uncompensated), managed care penetration,
demographics of the population served, level of competition
from other delivery systems in the same markets, and the
effects of other federal and state policies, such as fraud and
abuse detection and Medicaid payment rates. Hospitals that
have historically subsidized other lines of business with
Medicare funds seem especially vulnerable to the effects of
the BBA.
Data needed to evaluate the impact of the BBA
changes are not available in many cases. In addition, the
gradual or delayed phase-in of many BBA provisions, the
concomitant effects of marketplace changes, and other
legislative and regulatory activities make it difficult to
precisely determine the impact of the BBA. Nevertheless,
the enactment of the BBA marked the end of an era in
health care financing. The philosophies that undergird
many of its provisions raise fundamental questions about
the role of Medicare in the broader U.S. health care
system. How hospital-based systems respond to this new
financial environment has important ramifications for the
future of health care delivery.
To better understand the changes that hospitals and
related providers face in the post-BBA environment and
ways in which those changes might affect access to and
delivery of care, the National Health Policy Forum sponsored
three separate site visits in March and April 2000, with the
support of the Robert Wood Johnson and John A. Hartford
Foundations. Supplementary funds were also provided by the
W. K. Kellogg Foundation. These site visits were designed
as case studies to examine three hospital-based systems that
represent alternative combinations and configurations of
services operating in different types of markets.

Most of the provisions of the BBA began to take effect
in fiscal year 1998; the remainder will gradually be phased
in, with full implementation by 2002. As its many provisions
have come into effect, and with providers feeling increased
financial pressure, Congress has been heavily lobbied by
industry groups to restore Medicare funding. In 1999,
Congress responded with the Medicare, Medicaid, and
SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA), which
provides $16 billion of additional funding over five years and
$27 billion over 10 years ($7 billion directly to hospitals).

SITE VISITS

It is difficult to sort out the effects of the BBA on the
financial status of hospitals and related providers from those

Site visitors learned about the structures of each of the
participating hospital-based systems, the services they
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provide, the populations they serve, and the circumstances
they face. The key objective was to assess how each
hospital-based system plans to meet the challenges of the
post-BBA era and what its strategies may mean for the
system’s ability to fulfill its missions as well as for broader
national policy objectives. Because of their limited scope,
these case studies were not meant to provide definitive
conclusions about the status of all hospital-based systems
today; however, they were intended to provide new
insights and perspectives regarding the future of health
care delivery.
Three different hospital-based health systems opened
their doors to NHPF site visitors, allowing participants to
have an inside look at each system’s challenges, priorities,
and strategies for the future. The three selected health care
systems offered an opportunity to look at BBA impacts
from different vantage points. First, the Bon Secours
Health System, Inc. (BSHSI), with its heavy emphasis on
post-acute services, allowed participants to better understand the impact of payment changes across delivery sites.
Next, the Henry Ford Health System (HFHS) presented an
excellent example of the challenges facing an integrated
delivery system, known for delivery innovation and quality
improvement, as it struggles to stay financially viable in
the wake of reduced Medicare and Medicaid payment
rates. Finally, site visitors to the University of Washington
Academic Medical Center (UW AMC) gained new insight
into how one of the most significant AMCs in the country
is dealing with private and public challenges.

ANNAPOLIS WORKSHOP
On April 27 and 28, NHPF sponsored an invitationonly workshop in Annapolis, Maryland, at which the
findings from the site visits were featured. Participants
included nearly 70 health policy officials, including
members of the Forum’s Steering Committee and Private
Markets Technical Advisory Group (TAG), as well as
other invited representatives from Capitol Hill, congressional support agencies, and executive branch agencies.
On the first afternoon, workshop participants examined the trend data leading up to the BBA, the rationale for
many of its provisions, and the legislative and fiscal
environment in which both the original law and subsequent
refinements were enacted. In addition, the most recent
post-BBA data regarding Medicare spending and utilization were presented. This session was moderated by Sheila
Burke, chair of NHPF’s Private Markets TAG and executive dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Speakers included current and former legislative aides who
were instrumental in writing and designing the BBA as
well as analysts who have been monitoring the impact of
the BBA on Medicare spending and utilization trends.
2

Day two highlighted findings from the three site visits
described above. Representatives from each of the participating health systems made presentations that were
followed by commentary from site visit participants
regarding their key impressions.
Gail Warden, president and chief executive officer
(CEO), spoke on behalf of HFHS at the workshop. His
focus was an assessment of how Medicare payment
policies help or hinder integration of care. He observed
that the BBA had removed some Medicare dollars from
the system altogether and redistributed others among
different components of an integrated system such as
HFHS. At the same time that HFHS was trying to re-orient
itself to absorb BBA cuts, the state of Michigan sharply
reduced Medicaid payment rates. The combined impact
has caused HFHS to eliminate 1,300 staff positions,
downsize community-based programs, and reduce its
commitments to graduate medical education, health
promotion, clinical quality improvement training, and
other innovative programs. Warden acknowledged that
BBA-related belt-tightening had brought about improvements in HFHS’s business practices; however, he expressed concern over the growing numbers of uninsured
and the federal government’s increasing distance from the
needs of low-income populations.
Everard O. Rutledge, Ph.D., vice president of community health, BSHSI, described Bon Secours’ vision of a new
delivery model that seeks to provide an integrated continuum
of care. To pursue this vision, Bon Secours has engaged in a
proactive strategy to diversify operating risk, achieve
adequate organizational size, and enhance system behaviors
(for example, adopting best practices). Eileen Malo, vice
president of continuing care for Bon Secours Hampton
Roads, focused her remarks on the health system’s operations in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Bon Secours Hampton
Roads has estimated the net impact of the BBA and the
BBRA to be nearly $36 million over three years. While she
acknowledged that the BBA provided needed reforms such
as improved patient care delivery design and processes as
well as data development to benchmark quality, she warned
that the act has also resulted in several negative, unintended
results. She said that continuity of care has been impaired by
delinked financial incentives and that access to needed
services has been limited or denied, especially skilled
nursing for medically complex residents and certain home
health services. Finally, she emphasized that the BBA has
resulted in an increasing workload and stress for health care
workers and that the inadequate payment rates have left the
system with no opportunity to adjust wages to reflect value,
leading to shortages of certified nurse assistants, registered
nurses, and nursing home administrators.
In the briefing that John B. Coombs, M.D., associate
vice president for medical affairs and associate dean of the

University of Washington’s School of Medicine, provided
Annapolis participants, he reviewed UW AMC’s component parts and described the environment in which each
component operates and the public and private policies to
which each responds. Focusing on the academic program,
he emphasized its five-state reach (Washington, Wyoming,
Alaska, Montana, and Idaho), as he looked at state and
regional pressures on a system that is broadly dispersed. In
breaking down revenues and costs, he stressed the public
benefits—in regional and safety-net services, basic scientific advances, and technology—that the system provides.
In looking at Medicare, Medicaid, charity care, and other
aspects of the BBA, he predicted a $58 million to $65
million impact in the next five years, compounded by
cutbacks in state-funded programs.
The workshop concluded with a wrap-up session at
which participants were asked to tie together the legislative, regulatory, and delivery system priorities that had
been discussed throughout the conference. The key
question driving the discussion was what role Medicare
should play in an interdependent, public-private financing
and delivery system.
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The Three Site Visits:
Background and Impressions
%216(&2856+($/7+6<67(0,1&
BACKGROUND
NHPF organized a two-day site visit to Richmond and
Hampton Roads on March 16 and 17, 2000, to study postBBA issues in the context of the Bon Secours Health System’s Virginia operations. The site visit was designed to help
policymakers better understand how changing payment
incentives—particularly the move to prospective payment
systems for post-acute services—has affected the ability to
implement a continuum of care across delivery sites. Eleven
individuals participated in the site visit, including representatives from the U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Congressional Budget
Office, Congressional Research Service, and U.S. House and
Senate staff.

Components
The not-for-profit Bon Secours Health System, Inc.,
includes 24 owned or joint-ventured acute care hospitals,
nine long-term nursing care facilities, seven assisted and
independent living facilities, 11 home care and hospice
services, and numerous primary care and outpatient
facilities in 14 communities across nine states. Bon
Secours has pursued strategic growth in existing and new
communities. The growth objectives are to develop a
concentrated presence on the East Coast and, within each
community served, to develop a continuum of health care
services that meet the community’s needs and is attractive
to managed care plans. This site visit examined the system’s operations in Virginia, which include four hospitals
in Richmond and three hospitals in the Hampton Roads
area, in addition to nursing care, home health, assisted
living, and ambulatory care facilities.

Health Marketplace
In the Richmond metropolitan area, two major networks have developed, Bon Secours and Columbia.
Columbia has four hospitals in Richmond and holds 40
percent of the market share. The leading hospital is
operated by the Medical College of Virginia, with a 24
percent market share. CenVaNet is a physician-hospital
joint venture formed in 1996. This regional organization
comprises 11 participating hospitals, 1,500 physicians, and
4

a complete continuum of ancillary services. In addition, it
is the leading delivery system in Medicare and Medicaid
managed care in central Virginia, accounting for 21,000
combined lives. Managed care penetration in Richmond is
low. Payers have either abandoned products designed
around capitation/risk or are discontinuing capitation/risk
deals as corporate strategies.
Bon Secours Richmond Health System owns four
geographically dispersed hospitals. It participates in the
CenVaNet as a founding member and holds approximately
a 30 percent market share. Besides acute care, the continuum of services includes hospice, home care, occupational
medicine, senior services, assisted living facilities and
physician support services.
In Hampton Roads, Sentara and Tidewater Health Care
recently merged their two systems into a joint operating
company, making Sentara the leading acute care provider in
Hampton Roads and the only acute care provider in Virginia
Beach. Bon Secours Hampton Roads has two major
competitors—Sentara, which operates five acute care
hospitals, and Riverside Health System, which operates four
hospitals. Sentara commands 46 percent of the market share;
Bon Secours is the second leading provider network, with a
20 percent market share. Managed care penetration in
Hampton Roads is stabilizing at around 28 percent. Capitated products have not been successful in this market, except
for specialty services such as behavioral medicine.
Bon Secours Hampton Roads consists of three acute
care hospitals, a behavioral medicine facility, two nursing
care centers, and one existing assisted living facility and an
assisted living facility in construction. Additionally, the
service continuum includes home health, off-site diagnostics, primary care, urgent care, outpatient rehabilitation and
occupational health services, physician practices, and an
outpatient facility.

PROGRAM
Site visitors spent the first day in Richmond discussing
the changing health care financing environment, the
responses of the hospitals and other parts of the Bon
Secours system, and the impact on the system’s patient
care and social missions. Discussions centered on shifts in
the sources of revenue, federal and state policy changes,

and market consolidation and competition. On day two,
participants visited the Hampton Roads Virginia area,
which includes Portsmouth, Norfolk, and Virginia Beach.
Discussion focused on the challenges of developing an
infrastructure across the continuum of care and the impact
of new prospective payment policies on acute, skilled
nursing, and home health care delivery. Site visitors also
toured a nursing home and an assisted living facility.

IMPRESSIONS

Competition has caused the Bon Secours
Health System to think more strategically.
Through a series of acquisitions, BSHSI has pursued
strategic growth in existing and new communities. These
acquisitions have enabled Bon Secours to consolidate
services and thereby reduce excess capacity. For now, the
acquisitions seem to allow them to stay competitive in the
managed care market. Yet it remains to be seen whether
these multiple lines of business will remain profitable. Bon
Secours has found that effective consolidation of services
requires significant investments in information systems.
Future success will depend on its ability to successfully
coordinate care through the various levels of integration.

BSHSI is willing to exit unprofitable operations when
needs can be met by other means or providers. Selective
movement of certain profitable services outside of institutional settings (for example, oncology, neurology, radiology) have made it difficult to subsidize unprofitable lines
of business.
In Richmond, Bon Secours has recently acquired Stuart
Circle Hospital and Richmond Community Hospital and
plans to close Stuart Circle in the near future. This closure
will shift more of the burden of indigent care onto the
Medical College of Virginia. Initially, the community—
through the certificate-of-need process—had objected to the
closing of Stuart Circle but these objections seemed to have
been overcome.
In Hampton Roads, Bon Secours has acquired DePaul
Medical Center and Portsmouth General, which was closed
shortly after purchase. Services previously provided at
Portsmouth General have been consolidated at Maryview
Medical Center, a Bon Secours hospital, and at Bon Secours
Health Center at Harbor View, an outpatient facility.

In light of competition and population
shifts, Bon Secours has elected to move
facilities to the suburbs.

Bon Secours has developed comprehensive assessments of the unique needs and capacities of each of the
fourteen communities it serves. Observations of the
differences between the Richmond and Hampton Roads
marketplaces show that while the corporate parent can
offer direction, all health care is essentially local.

Payer mix seems more critical for financial stability
than patient mix in the new health financing environment.
Bon Secours Richmond has entered into joint ventures to
relocate urban hospitals to suburban locations strategically
placed near interstates. Moving to the suburbs seems to be
a direct effort to follow insured patients.

Bon Secours’ business strategies seemed designed to
make money or avoid losses and mirrored strategies
usually associated with for-profit entities. This troubled
some site visitors who thought the Catholic non-profit had
lost sight of its mission. They raised concerns about the
implications for charity care and care of the uninsured.
Other site visitors thought the hospital-based system had
responded appropriately to payment incentives and had
done what it needed to do to survive in today’s marketplace, such as reducing marginal services and consolidating to improve efficiency.

Relocation of hospitals is also important for successful
managed care contracting. Bon Secours is number two in
the marketplace in both Richmond and Hampton Roads.
This position gives it much less negotiating clout with
managed care plans. For example, Columbia/HCA, which
has a 40 percent market share in Richmond, routinely
achieves a 30 percent greater reimbursement from private
payers than Bon Secours does.

In each of the markets in which it operates, Bon Secours tries to find its niche
and focus on core strengths, striving to be
the number one or number two delivery
system (direct or aligned) in markets
served.

In Hampton Roads, the leading system, Sentara, had
been able to shut Bon Secours’ facilities out of managed
care contracts. Bon Secours has had to work aggressively
to be included in the Sentara network of products, which
includes Optima—the area’s largest health maintenance
organization (HMO).

Creating a system to deliver an integrated
continuum of care is a key operating
principle of Bon Secours.
5

The Bon Secours service continuum includes acute
care hospitals, SNFs, assisted or independent living
facilities, primary clinics, physician service organizations,
home health services, hospices, and community-based
prevention and wellness programs.
The basic strategy of Bon Secours is to operate as a
system, with each entity doing its best to carry its own
weight. Site visitors speculated that, through Medicare
policies, managed care, and private payer policies, the
future may see the demise of the stand-alone facility.
Views on whether this was positive or negative varied.
In care management, Bon Secours has been trying to
move from episodic care to population management. While
it is not quite there yet, it has made improvements in chronic
care patient management. Its model favors heavy R.N.
involvement across the continuum.
Care management has also focused on reducing
variations by comparing all facilities in the system to one
another. Bon Secours has focused on developing an
infrastructure to successfully work within the “averages”
dictated by prospective payment systems.
While integrated delivery is the goal, the Bon Secours
systems have a way to go in terms of full system integration.
Payment incentives often create instances in which one part
of the system competes against another. It is difficult to
integrate care delivery in such a way as to ensure that loss to
the overall system is at a minimum (for example, trouble
placing hospital patients into skilled nursing can result in
higher total system cost). Impact on the bottom line could be
lessened if services were better coordinated.
Labor pressures have hampered Bon Secours’ ability to
provide needed services and keep costs down. Nursing
shortages and home health and nursing aide shortages are
prevalent. The booming economy, coupled with increased
paperwork requirements and the demands of caring for
complex patients, have made recruitment extremely difficult.

The BBA has challenged Bon Secours’
ability to fulfill its mission.
Changed financial incentives and payment reductions
have caused the system to better coordinate and manage
post-acute care. For example, home health care providers
reported that they have had to move their care philosophy
more in the direction of teaching family caregivers to
provide care and away from providing care directly.
Hospital discharges to SNFs have had to be better coordinated and marginal home health visits have been reduced.

6

SNF, home health, and transfer payment changes have
affected acute facilities’ ability to discharge patients,
according to BSHSI representatives. Several staff members
said it had been increasingly difficult to place patients who
meet care criteria because the SNFs will not or cannot
accept them.
Reduced revenue has forced Bon Secours to eliminate
select missions programs and to search for grant funding to
support missions such a mobile “care-a-van.” Yet, site
visitors noted that, despite payment reductions, Bon Secours
has been able to make significant capital acquisitions.
The Bon Secours Richmond home health agency has
a low interim payment system cap rate based on earlier
experiences. As a result, Bon Secours officials contend,
efficient providers have been penalized. The interim
payment system has been a major challenge; Bon Secours
representatives believe their organization will do better
under the prospective payment system.
As an integrated health care system, Bon Secours
officials believe the most needed additional BBA refinements are an increase in the Medicare hospital inpatient
payment rate and the repeal of the 15 percent reduction in
payments for home care services. The anticipation of an
outpatient prospective payment system causes them to be
concerned about the system’s future ability to provide care
in the most appropriate setting.
One Bon Secours hospital in the Richmond area
receives disproportionate share payments from Medicare.
The BBA changes have created concerns about the ability
to provide a safety net to uninsured patients.
While Medicare’s tightened payments have clearly
affected BSHSI’s bottom line, the evidence presented at the
site visit indicated that private-payer efforts were at least as
important in contributing to the system’s financial condition.
In addition, Virginia’s Medicaid program has also had a
negative impact, with a recent move to mandatory managed
care and a practice of retroactive payment reductions.

Gearing up for new regulations places
significant burden on staff and resources.
For example, the SNF’s entire profit margin for 1998
was used to get systems in place for prospective payment.
OASIS has been a big expense and time drain, according
to the home health agency representative. However, site
visitors expressed concern that the agency did not recognize the value in measuring quality and health status—key
objectives of the OASIS system.

The promise of more choice in the Medicare program has not materialized in the
Richmond and Hampton Roads markets.
Medicare HMOs have not done well in either marketplace. Before the BBA, Richmond had five HMOs participating in the Medicare-risk program; today, only one
HMO (CIGNA) participates in Medicare+Choice. In
Hampton Roads, there are currently no Medicare HMOs
available for beneficiaries.
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pharmacy, home infusion, dialysis, and home health and
private-duty nursing care.
The Henry Ford Sciences Center, which comprises the
Henry Ford Research Institute and the School for Health
Sciences, combines teaching, research, and advanced
patient care. The School for Health Sciences offers more
than 70 physician, nurse, allied health, and continuing
medical education programs. It has educational affiliations
with a variety of midwestern institutions, including Case
Western Reserve University School of Medicine, University of Michigan School of Medicine, Chicago Medical
School, and the Medical College of Ohio.

Health Marketplace
BACKGROUND
NHPF organized a one-day site visit to the Henry Ford
Health System in Detroit on March 20. Participants
included representatives of the Office of Management and
Budget, the Health Care Financing Administration, the
Veterans Health Administration, Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, and the Urban Institute. HFHS
president and CEO Warden and HFHS government affairs
vice president Burgess assembled a rota of key executives
to discuss the impact of the BBA on an integrated health
system.

Components
HFHS provides acute, primary, specialty, and preventive care to a diverse population. It includes the Henry
Ford Hospital, a 903-bed tertiary facility in Detroit, and the
359-bed Henry Ford Wyandotte Hospital to the west of the
city; HFHS also participates in joint ventures with Bon
Secours and Mercy Health Services to provide services in
outlying areas. (A Mercy hospital in Detroit, formerly part
of the joint venture, was recently closed.)
HFHS operates the Health Alliance Plan (HAP), a
mixed-model managed care plan with 540,000 members,
and the Child Health Network, a joint venture with the
Children’s Hospital of Michigan to coordinate pediatric
care. The Henry Ford Medical Group is one of the nation’s
largest group practices, with 850 salaried physicians in 40
specialties. Horizon Health System is one of the major
osteopathic providers in Michigan. Henry Ford Behavioral
Health offers inpatient care for those experiencing severe
episodes of mental illness and both residential and outpatient treatment for chemical dependency. Henry Ford
Senior Services coordinates care for the elderly and
operates two nursing homes. The William Clay Ford
Center for Athletic Medicine treats many members of
Detroit’s professional sports teams. Henry Ford Hospice
serves more than 1,100 patients annually. Community Care
Services offers a variety of supplies and services, including

HFHS operates primarily in an area comprising
Wayne, Oakland, Monroe, Washtenaw, and Macomb
counties, which encompasses a range of socioeconomic
conditions from inner-city Detroit to upscale suburbia
(Oakland is said to be the second-richest county in the
United States). Henry Ford Hospital, HFHS’s anchor
facility, is located in Detroit, where it shares safety-net
responsibility with the Detroit Medical Center (DMC).
Since two other safety-net hospitals have closed, and
DMC’s financial situation is precarious, the responsibility
for uncompensated care is of grave concern to HFHS. The
Beaumont system dominates in well-to-do Oakland. Other
players include the St. John, Mercy, Oakwood, and Bon
Secours systems, as well as the University of Michigan.
HFHS owns two of the area’s 12 hospitals, and accounts
for approximately 11 percent of admissions in southeast
Michigan. HFHS officials point out that no one in southeast
Michigan lives more than 10 or 15 minutes from an HFHS
facility. HFHS is recognized as a market leader in general
medicine, neurosciences, and orthopedics.
One in four residents of southeast Michigan is enrolled
in a managed care plan. Of this group, approximately onethird are members of HFHS’s Health Allliance Plan.
HFHS’s payer mix in 1999 was 43 percent managed
care (primarily from HAP), 26 percent Medicare, 10
percent Blue Cross Blue Shield, 5 percent Medicaid, and
16 percent other. Medicaid patients are also reflected in the
managed care figure.

PROGRAM
Warden and various staff members kicked off the day
with a breakfast briefing on HFHS’s overall structure, case
mix, competition, and strategies for adapting to changes in
health care delivery and financing. Successive panels
focused in turn on financing and information systems, the
integration of diversified services, academic mission and
outreach, safety net services, and hospital operations.
7

IMPRESSIONS

Henry Ford Health System (HFHS) is not
contemplating abandoning either its mission in Detroit or its commitment to delivering a full range of integrated health care.
However, “the need to earn revenues where we can” is
forcing greater concentration on certain “centers of excellence” within the system.

Responding to the BBA was like the process of grief (anger, denial, etc.), but ultimately the scrutiny of expenditures and
assumptions and the redesign of processes
that it forced were beneficial.
In this light, the BBA may be regarded as a necessary
call to greater efficiency. Cost containment has been
achieved, and still patient satisfaction reportedly is higher
than it has ever been.

HFHS president and CEO Warden credits
his optimism—a belief that the system will
return to profitability—to HFHS characteristics not shared by all hospital systems:
(a) an in-house medical group that can to
some extent be told what to do and that in
any case has a stake in the whole organization’s performance; (b) an ability—still—
to attract the best and brightest practitioners; and (c) an in-house health plan that
has been challenged but not obliterated.
The Health Alliance Plan (HAP) steers business to the
hospitals, and disputes between the plan and provider sides
are “family feuds” that can be resolved at the executive
level rather than fought to the death. (It should be noted
that other HFHS executives, taking a perhaps narrower
view, are concerned about their ability to continue to fulfill
all aspects of HFHS’s education, research, and community
missions.)

There have been casualties of the postBBA turnaround plan.
Five hundred employees were laid off and other positions shed through attrition and a voluntary severance
package. No component of the system has gone unscathed in
this process. Programs not directly linked to patient care,
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such as training, prevention, and outreach, have been deemphasized or suspended. Nevertheless, there was surprisingly little discussion of Medicare payment inadequacy.

HFHS’s biggest problem may well be the
state of Michigan.
An ongoing certificate of need requirement has stymied
plans to expand into geographic areas with a stronger payer
mix. Medicaid rates have been slashed, even though the state
has a substantial rainy-day fund at its disposal. Medicaid
reimbursement is adjusted for age and sex but not health
status. The only profitable category is males under the age of
one. Michigan is one of only a few states that includes the
disabled in the capitated population.

Safety-net funding is problematic across
the board.
The county has not increased its reimbursement rates
in at least ten years. Very little federal money is available
for Detroit’s uninsured. “The market is not going to decide
in favor of the poor.”

Emergency services are a major concern
for HFHS, particularly in that Detroit
Medical Center, the other safety-net provider, has severe financial problems.
The emergency room is a significant source of admissions to Henry Ford Hospital, not surprising given the poor
population in the surrounding community, where some
health indicators were described as “third-world-like.”

Local employers, notably the automobile
companies, place heavy emphasis on
quality measurement and improvement.
HFHS is GM’s benchmark plan. HFHS physicians are
involved in and committed to in-house quality improvement efforts.

The most significant variable in generating revenue is payer mix, not case mix or
volume.
Overall, though, each payer increasingly wants to
cover only its own population and wants any gains from

efficiency to be returned in the form of lower rates. Crosssubsidization is a thing of the past.

CarePlus, the electronic patient record
system, continues to develop.
A current project is an enhanced security protocol,
designed in anticipation of allowing patients access to their
own records. Getting doctors to use CarePlus has not been
an issue; making the system available whenever they want
it is still a challenge.
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BACKGROUND
NHPF organized an April 10 and 11 site visit at the
University of Washington for seven federal congressional
and agency health staff and a health policy analyst from a
think tank to explore post-BBA academic health center
(AHC) issues. The visit focused on the challenges UW
faces in carrying out its three missions of delivery of health
services (with emphasis on the safety net), health professions education, and health science and clinical research.
The visit developed the themes through briefings, panel
discussions, a van tour of the UW complex and affiliated
organizations, and stops at individual facilities.

Components
UW has Schools of Dentistry, Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, Public Health and Community Medicine, and Social
Work that collectively are referred to as “the health sciences.” The vice president for medical affairs/dean of the
School of Medicine oversees UW’s Academic Medical
Center, which owns and/or manages UW Medical Center,
Harborview Medical Center, UW Physicians, UW Physicians Network, Children’s University Medical Group, and
Seattle Cancer Care Alliance. The AMC is closely affiliated
with Children’s Hospital and Regional Medical Center, Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, and VA Puget Sound
Health Care System. It administers a well-known education
program in five states: Washington, Wyoming, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho (WWAMI). The program’s service area
occupies about 27 percent of the land mass of the United
States and contains 9 million people.

Rankings
UW ranks high in various national AHC statistics. The
School of Medicine ranks sixth in the percentage of gradu-

ates practicing in the primary-care fields of family medicine,
general internal medicine, and general pediatrics. The school
has nearly 1,500 residents and fellows in accredited clinical
training, including 343 residents in its affiliated family
medicine network. Residency training in primary care and
some specialties takes place at more than 26 community sites
in the five states that UW serves. The school is consistently
among the top five medical schools in receipt of federal
research funding. In FY 1999, it received approximately
$282 million in grant and contract awards. It also is among
the top ten institutions in the nation in technology transfer.
The School of Nursing also is top-ranked nationally. It
has 450 clinical agreements for delivery of acute, longterm-care, and public health and community services. With
151 undergraduate and 300 graduate students, it provides
baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral degree programs and
has one of the oldest F.N.P. programs in the United States.
It ranks second in National Institutes of Health grants and
third in health science funding in the country. Moreover,
it has numerous interdisciplinary health service and
education projects.

Health Marketplace
Although UW serves five states, most of its services,
education, and research are concentrated in Washington.
According to Aaron Katz, director of UW’s Health Policy
Analysis Program, who provided an overview of the
marketplace at the beginning of the visit, the insurance
status of Washingtonians in 1998 was, as follows:











25 percent in large groups and 6 percent in small
groups;
19 percent in self-funded plans;
6 percent with individual policies;
2 percent in Medicare;
3 percent in the state’s Basic Health Plan;
4 percent in Medicaid fee-for-service;
8 percent in Healthy Options, Medicaid’s managed care
plan;
6 percent in Department of Defense programs; and
11 percent (540,000 persons) uninsured.

The state’s 1993 enactment and 1995 repeal of state
health insurance reforms resulted in extensive fluctuations in
the marketplace. For example, in response to the law,
Providence Health System, a Catholic provider in Seattle and
the rest of the state, had invested heavily in the acquisition of
primary-care practices and steadily lost money after the
repeal. It recently joined with Swedish Medical Center to
consolidate its Seattle-based Providence Medical Center with
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Swedish, putting the new operation in control of 52 percent
of the licensed nonfederal staffed beds in the city.

ambulatory care, education, and research; safety-net issues;
and impacts of the BBA and other issues.

According to Katz, Seattle has a long-standing tradition
of local, not-for-profit health plans and providers. Major
plans include Premera Blue Cross, Group Health Cooperative/Kaiser Permanente, Regence Blue Shield, and First
Choice (a provider-owned preferred provider organization
[PPO] and health plan).

The case study showed that UW AMC runs a gamut of
services—from preventive and primary to tertiary and
quaternary—with links to various kinds of post-acute care.
It underlined UW AMC’s heterogeneity, as the institution
draws upon public and private payers and multiple other
sources, with different payer mixes for its individual facilities. Relative to missions, the case study demonstrated that
UW AMC more than meets the definition of an AMC. Its
missions include delivery of services to a wide range of
patients (including those categorized as safety net), health
professions education across the health-care spectrum, and
broad-based health services and biomedical research.

HMO penetration rose to 35 percent in 1998 from 26
percent in 1997, although the popularity of PPOs and
point-of-service plans is said to be growing as consumers
opt for greater choice. Seattle’s HMO penetration rate was
slightly lower than the average for all metropolitan areas
and particularly low for the West Coast; however, the
state’s capitation rate (the percentage of providers accepting some capitation) of 70 percent was higher than that for
all metropolitan areas (about 63 percent). Its 1998 percentage of Medicare enrollees in risk contract health plans was
26 percent, while the national rate was 15 percent. The
health plan underwriting margin that year—approximately
minus 4 percent—was in the red for the fourth straight
year.
According to Katz, recent developments include the
following:







Health plan withdrawals from public programs, such as
Medicaid and the Basic Health Plan, as well as
Medicare+Choice.
The collapse of the individual insurance market.
Limits on state spending and revenue reductions through
two initiatives, affecting payments for health care.
A decline in overall hospital margins, with UW Medical Center at 2.4 percent and Harborview Medical
Center at 2.2 percent.
A tight labor market, affecting the supply of health
workers.

PROGRAM
Before the site visit program began, five attendees
made an optional visit to Children’s Hospital and Regional
Medical Center. The program, which began in midafternoon on April 10, featured a briefing—followed by
discussion—of UW’s health components and a dinner for
federal and Seattle participants. On April 11, federal
participants engaged in a series of tours and discussions at
UW Physicians Belltown Clinic, Pioneer Square Clinic (a
facility for persons who are homeless), Harborview
Medical Center, and UW AMC. Topics included the
market implications of the BBA; UW’s health service,
health professions education, and research missions;
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UW fully fits the definition of an “academic
health center” in its service delivery, health
professions education, and health sciences
and clinical research components, which
has policy implications relative to federal
and state recognition of those missions.
Prior to and during the visit, there was some discussion of
differences among AHCs and between an AHC and a
teaching hospital. From the start, participants saw UW as a
full-fledged AHC. In addition to meeting the Association of
Academic Health Centers’ base requirements of a medical
school plus one other health professions school (for example,
a nursing school), UW has five other health professions
schools; in addition to at least one teaching hospital, it
manages another and is affiliated with others. Moreover, its
complex includes numerous other entities: physician clinics,
research centers, and other organizations. For those who
arrived with preconceptions, UW confirmed the adage, “If
you’ve seen one AHC, you’ve seen one AHC.” In terms of
policy, it called into question whether service and education
adjustments intended to preserve the two AHC missions
cover the circumstances of contrasting AHCs. For instance,
can one payment policy address the circumstances of an
AHC like UW as well as those of much smaller complexes
that rank low in the acuity of patients and in the number and
breadth of residents trained?

While UW provides concentrated services to
Seattle, the surrounding counties, and
Washington, its status as an AHC serving
five states seems to have both positive and
negative ramifications.

Most participants had a favorable view of the uniqueness
and geographic reach of UW as the one AHC in the
region—for example, in its specialty referral services,
provision of the only Level I trauma services in the state of
Washington, and WWAMI education program. For example,
one participant had this impression: “UW serves as a unique
educational resource for five thinly populated states. It would
have been economically and organizationally unthinkable for
states like Idaho and Montana, which only recently approached one million population, to develop their own
medical schools. It’s an example of taking regional responsibility.” Some other participants took a different view. They
tended to see UW as monolithic. Seeing health care as local,
they were suspicious of UW’s concentrated resources,
especially as an educational and referral center for people
from other states. For instance, even within Washington,
some worried about barriers to trauma care due to traffic,
weather, distance, and time. UW officials indicated, however, that their data regarding trauma care in the region did
not support this worry.

A state institution that manages or is affiliated with a group of facilities and organizations (for example, a county hospital, a
federal health network, and not-for-profit
physician clinics), UW acts as an “academic
entrepreneur.” However, its entrepreneuralism is tempered, so that it seemingly has
avoided the mistakes of some other providers in the Seattle area or of some other
AMCs in the country.
Participants discerned dynamism at UW—at Belltown
Clinic, Pioneer Square Clinic, Harborview Medical Center,
and at UW Medical Center—that led one federal site
visitor to say, “UW is academically entrepreneurial.”
Officials at UW seem to have a knack for putting pieces
together while avoiding the pitfalls that some other
providers in the area, such as Providence Health System,
have encountered. For example, instead of acquiring
physician practices in order to build a primary-care base,
the UW AMC had organized the not-for-profit Physician
Network of nine primary-care clinics from the ground up.
On the other hand, in the words of one federal participant,
there were no indications that UW is making overt moves
to “game” the reimbursement system, for example, by
developing post-discharge “subacute” beds or by setting
up satellite clinics as hospital outpatient departments.

While UW has all the service delivery pieces,
either by ownership or affiliation, necessary

for a full continuum of care, continuity of
care seems to be a facility-by-facility, rather
than a systemwide, concern.
While it could have been a function of separate
discussions—particularly at Harborview Medical Center and
UW Medical Center—the idea of a system of care seemed to
be institution-specific rather than systemwide. UW officials
contended that development and oversight of the continuum
are at the system level, while execution of the strategy for
continuity—which is dependent on collaboration among
physicians, nurses, social workers, and others—is at the
institutional level. However, some individual physicians
seemed to be integrators. Examples include F. Bruder
Stapleton, M.D., pediatrician-in-chief at Children’s Hospital
and Regional Medical Center and chair of UW’s Department
of Pediatrics, and Wayne C. McCormick, M.D., associate
professor of medicine in the Division of Gerontology and
Geriatric Medicine, Harborview Medical Center, and
medical director of VNS. In addition, some departments
seemed more interested than others in integrating care; the
School of Nursing, for instance, seems to be behind numerous interdisciplinary continuum-of-service efforts.

UW facilities and providers share the safetynet mission.
Participants were struck by the sense of mission that
pervaded UW, a sense of shared commitment to safety-net
services. This was particularly striking at Harborview
Medical Center. The county hospital managed by UW,
Harborview gives priority for care to persons who are
incarcerated, mentally ill, substance-abusing, indigent, or
belong to certain other vulnerable populations. The
commitment to mission was demonstrated first-hand at
Harborview’s Pioneer Square Clinic, an ambulatory
facility for persons who are homeless or otherwise without
access to care, and at Harborview’s Crisis Triage Unit, a
crisis stabilization center in the Emergency Department for
screening mental health, chemical dependency, and
developmental disability needs.

Harborview Medical Center is an unusual
public hospital, in that it combines public
patient caseloads with a high percentage of
privately insured, seems to seek to deliver
services (generally subsidized) that some
other facilities shun, has access to capital,
and is breaking even.
Harborview Medical Center’s financial profile for 1999
includes 34 percent Medicaid, 21 percent Medicare, 7
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percent no pay, and 38 percent private pay/insured. With its
11 categories of priority patients, it combines last-resort
(public inebriates) with first-resort (burn treatment and
specialized emergency care) patients. To break even, it
supplements its routine patient-care revenues with public
subsidies: Medicaid disproportionate-share hospital (DSH),
special state, trauma, and interagency funds; Medicare DSH,
direct medical education, and indirect medical education
(IME) dollars; and other funds. It has access to capital
through UW, the state, Medicare, and periodic bond issues.

UW health facilities are efficiently managed, which works to their detriment when
national payment policies are imposed upon
them. Some think this calls for better recognition of geographic variation in Medicare
payment policy, while others are doubtful
that it would reward the more efficient.
As discussed during the site visit and summarized by one
federal participant, health care in the Northwest is traditionally viewed as efficient. The average length of stay (ALOS)
in the region is consistently lower than the national average.
In 1998, for example, the ALOS in Washington was 4.6
days, while the national average was 5.8 days. Home health
utilization averaged 24 visits per patient in the state, compared to the national average of 51. Skilled-nursing facility
utilization averages were also lower in Washington, at 24.5
days, while the national average was 28.5. The AAPCC
(Medicare capitation amount) in Washington is also consistently lower than the national average, and there are debates
about the reasons. One participant who attributed it to greater
efficiency concluded that it means the system experiences a
greater impact from global changes to federal programs,
particularly those aimed at getting greater efficiency from
inefficient providers. This participant thought it advisable to
consider geographic diversity in Medicare payment policy.
Another participant opposed this idea, indicating that the
Northwest generally benefitted when Medicare moved to one
national standardized amount (as opposed to payments based
on regional costs).

Complaints about the effects of the BBA on
operating revenues are obviated somewhat
by UW’s ambitious construction projects, a
contrast that has come to be called “the
crane problem.”
As some participants saw and heard about new
projects—the construction of an expanded Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, a new Research and Technology Building at Harborview Medical Center, and a bond
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issue for a new building at Harborview to replace one that
is not seismically sound—they reacted. To use a term
coined during an NHPF site visit to AHCs in Boston, they
had a “crane problem.” A crane problem arises when AHC
administrators complain about federal cuts in hospital
operating revenues when their complexes are filled with
the cranes of construction projects. In Seattle, the crane
problem came up even though the Fred Hutchinson hotel
facility was funded by private donations and the Research
and Technology Building by a mix of university and state
funds; the bond issue, the first in 15 years, is scheduled to
go before county taxpayers this year for approval. Moreover, UW officials indicated that these projects had been
in the planning stages for ten or more years and that UW
ranks low among its peer AMCs in the ratio of square
footage per dollar of research funding.

UW is experiencing a shortage of workers in
post-acute settings (largely due to a robust
economy) and difficulty (attributed to BBA
cuts) in referral of patients from acute to
post-acute care, but its post-acute provider
arrangements seem to be stable at present.
In Seattle and in Washington as a whole, as in other parts
of the country, competition for employees has led to a
shortage of low-wage workers in nursing homes and home
health agencies. Aware that this affects the ability of acute
facilities to discharge patients needing a lower level of care,
participants sought to learn how severe the problem is and to
what extent it is influenced by market forces as opposed to
provisions in the BBA (for example, provision for SNF
prospective payment, ceilings on rehabilitation services, and
imposition of a home health interim payment system).
Anecdotally, while SNFs and home health agencies in
Seattle were described as having undergone strain, they also
were said to have survived. Practice patterns seem to be a
factor, such as having the second- or third-lowest days per
1,000. (UW does not have SNF or home health facilities; it
does have six teams of geriatric-trained providers who go to
12 affiliated nursing homes and other facilities to see
patients.) There seems to be continuity in providers’ following patients from acute to post-acute beds, a practice said to
ease problems in the discharge of patients from one setting
to another.

There are shortages of certain health professionals (for example, pediatric specialists
and nurses).
Some participants took part in a pre-site visit to Children’s Hospital and Regional Medical Center, which is

affiliated with UW; it handles most pediatric cases, trains 72
pediatric residents, and conducts pediatric-based research.
Participants learned that there is a shortage of pediatric
specialists, at a time when policymakers in Washington have
become attuned to thinking of pediatricians mainly as
primary-care providers. (However, the graduate medical
education program for children’s hospitals enacted in late
1999 does not differentiate between types of pediatric
residents.) A severe shortage of nurses of all types was also
pointed out, with one participant noting that a positive
benefit of a BBA provision on independent practice for nurse
practitioners was enhancement of the value of their work.

percent potentially avoidable days is one of the lowest we
have observed and indicates well managed delivery of
care.” It concluded that current case rates “do not accurately compensate for the care of these severity level
patients.” Responding to UW’s assertion that it handles 70
percent of the high-risk obstetrics patients in the Seattle
area, federal participants questioned the availability of an
adequate measure of severity, the determination of winners
and losers relative to the type of measure, and, because the
IME is used as an indicator of greater acuity in teaching
hospitals, the need to separate out what supports teaching
and what supports patient care.

CHIP is viewed as unsuccessful in Washington, because providers do not want to
accept patients and because enrollment has
been slow.

While confusing in policy terms, the lack of
explicit definitions for Medicare payment
adjustments—for example, IME and DSH
—is viable in political terms.

Washington had already moved to 200 percent of the
federal poverty level for Medicaid eligibility before CHIP
was enacted as part of the BBA. So Washington’s CHIP
target is to enroll eligible children at 250 percent of
poverty in its Medicaid program. Because this applies only
to 9,200 children (out of 72,671 children who are uninsured), the chances for success seem slim, according to
information provided by Children’s Hospital and Regional
Medical Center. While CHIP did not figure prominently in
site visit discussions, the comments about it invariably
centered on its small enrollment and its general lack of
acceptance by providers.

Picking up on the discussion of the level of acuity and
the fuzziness of the concept of IME and, to some extent,
DSH, some participants indicated that strict definitions
would fail to gain the adjustments political acceptance.
Other participants pointed to the need for targeting and
adjusting for specific needs: in the case of IME, the costs
of training residents, and, in the case of DSH, care for lowincome people in the Medicare program.

Overall, UW health facilities’ level of acuity
is higher than the levels of other providers
in the area, which has led UW officials to
seek a severity adjustment, but the adjustment’s definition and ultimate benefit are in
doubt.
UW participants presented a Milliman & Robertson,
Inc., analysis of patient severity and efficiency that compared UW Medical Center 1995 and 1996 data on commercial patients with those of three other hospitals. The
firm used specific ALOS and charge bias to examine discharges for all patient refined diagnosis-related groups
(APR-DRGs). It found an estimated severity factor of 1.41
percent, which it said was “the highest we have found for
any health care system we have evaluated, academic or
otherwise.” The firm also looked at inpatient records for
commercial patients treated at UW Medical Center in
1997. Its analysis “indicated 125 potentially avoidable
days out of a total of 1,057 days reviewed, or 12 percent of
total days.” The firm concluded that the “finding of 12

Across the country, the VA’s relationships
with AHCs in providing safety-net services
to veterans, offering health professions
education, and conducting research (especially in focused areas, such as spinal-cord
injury) tend to be overlooked. This is not the
case in Seattle.
VA Puget Sound Health System is a vital partner of
UW. VA Puget Sound Health System has 250 staff with
faculty/teaching appointments at UW. Whether in providing care to service-connected veterans (and being part of
the safety-net that reaches out to the homeless); educating
500 medical residents (a $7 million program) as well as
nursing, dentistry, social work, and pharmacy students; or
conducting research, it has a large presence. Of VA units,
it is the fourth largest service network and has the second
largest research program in the country.

UW faces significant cross-cultural pressures, such as Harborview’s need to provide
interpreters for 70 languages, and is responding positively.
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UW’s cross-cultural initiatives—responding to the
patients from diverse immigrant populations in the area—
has become a model for other parts of the country. For
example, UW has a web link called “EthnoMed” that
provides cultural profiles, medical topics, cross-cultural
issues, and patient education. Some participants were
intrigued by the challenges UW— especially Harborview
Medical Center—has relative to cross-cultural competency, the growing emphasis on effective responses from
the health care system, and the costs involved.

One of the top academic research institutions
in the country, UW has research initiatives
ranging from collaborative programs with the
Fred Hutchinson Research Center, where the
physician who developed bone-marrow transplants is on staff, to a Harborview Medical
Center facility that conducts research centered on the health problems of vulnerable
people.
In exploring UW’s research initiatives, participants saw
the same degree of scope and breadth that they had with its
service delivery and education missions. Although they
spent less time discussing and seeing research components—because of lesser relevance to BBA provisions—
they nonetheless appreciated the commingling and interdependence of UW’s three missions and the participation in
all three by some UW faculty and staff with whom they
talked. Prominent examples are John Harlan, M.D., of
Harborview Medical Center’s Research and Technology
Building, who provided a tour of the new facility, and
Christopher Marsh, M.D., associate director of the Division of Transplantation, UW Medical Center, who described the service, education, and research aspects of
UW’s transplant program. Similarly, they benefitted from
the health services research of the Health Policy Analysis
Program, which publishes studies of health care in Washington on an ongoing basis.

In responding to the BBA, UW seemingly is
not changing its modus operandi but is
staying on course and is seeking revisions in
policy.
Some federal participants came to Seattle expecting
behavioral changes at UW in response to BBA provisions.
They came away from UW believing that the AMC itself
does not want to change the ways it is addressing its
service, teaching, and research missions to adapt to the
changes, but instead wants policymakers to revise the
policies to fit their practices. In this sense, there was
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somewhat of a power struggle, similar to that played out in
Washington, D.C., in the aftermath of the BBA and
passage of the BBRA.

The Annapolis Conference:
Overall Perspectives
The April 27–28 Annapolis conference had three
primary aims: (a) to put the BBA into context, particularly
relative to Medicare’s role; (b) to explore the post-BBA
implications for hospital-based systems, and (c) to examine
ways of aligning public and private incentives in delivery and
payment of health services. The two days of briefings and
discussions, focusing on the three case studies (Bon Secours,
Henry Ford, and UW AMC), resulted in some concluding
views as well as some new questions, contributing to an
agenda for future NHPF meetings and site visits.

Putting the BBA into Context,
Particularly Relative to Medicare’s Role

The three driving forces for the BBA
Medicare provisions were to reduce
growth in federal spending for health
services, expand private options for beneficiaries, and eliminate cost-based reimbursement by extending the Medicare
prospective payment system (PPS) to additional services.
When the bipartisan BBA was passed in 1997,
achieving a balanced budget was a major concern. Medicare budget outlays were increasing rapidly, with home
health the fastest growing Medicare program of all.
Another motivator was the desire to inject private market
incentives into the Medicare program: to offer beneficiaries a choice of managed care services and to encourage
health plans to compete to enroll them (ideally, with added
benefits). This led to inclusion of Medicare+Choice in the
BBA. A third impetus was to continue the move toward
prospective payment of Medicare services by placing
home health, skilled-nursing, and rehabilitation services,
as well as hospital outpatient care, under separately
developed PPS arrangements.

The BBA was a broad-brush effort to
reduce the growth of health costs relative
to those of other budget categories, recognize the importance of Medicare as a
portion of the overall budget, and adjust the
payments for Medicare Part A services
(paid from the payroll-tax-based Hospital

Insurance Trust Fund) relative to those for
Medicare Part B services (paid from beneficiary premiums and general revenues).
In 1997, with discretionary federal funding already
squeezed and Social Security off limits, Medicare became
the major target of federal budget cutters. Short of significant tax increases, the budget could not otherwise have
been balanced, some federal participants pointed out.
Moreover, the looming retirement of baby boomers put
pressure on budgeteers. While lawmakers were reluctant
to engage in Medicare reform, they could—and did—
consider achieving budget savings by reducing provider
payment rates. At the same time, they deemed the program
too important to impose cuts that might compromise
services. Additionally, with the Medicare trust fund
projected (at the start of 1997) to start running out of
money in 2001, the drafters of the legislation were able to
address the drain in part by moving most of home health
services to Part B.

On the acute-care side, teaching and safetynet hospitals seem to be the providers most
affected by BBA provisions, while on the
post-acute side, home health and SNFs
appear to be receiving the most impact.
The BBA targeted certain hospitals and providers. For
instance, in making reductions in the Medicare indirect
medical education (IME) adjustment and in Medicare
disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) payments, it more
heavily affected teaching hospitals and safety-net institutions, which are sometimes one and the same. But some
participants indicated that the goal was to restrain Medicare
spending relative to hospitals that they thought were overpaid (as reflected, in part, by operating margins), and the
additional payments resulting from the IME and DSH
adjustments therefore became targets. In subjecting Medicare
post-acute and outpatient hospital care to PPS arrangements,
the BBA also focused on the providers of those services,
although full implementation had yet to be achieved at the
time of the site visits and the Annapolis meeting. Mainly
because of the pre-PPS interim payment system established
by the BBA, participants tended to think that home health
and SNFs received the hardest BBA post-acute “hit.”
However, they disagreed about whether that entailed the
weeding out of unnecessary, uncovered, or fraudulently
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obtained care or the rationing of necessary, covered, and
appropriate services.

In singling out individual components, the
BBA swept into the “intricate webs of
internal and external cross-subsidies the
federal government provides for care of
the poor, teaching medical students, and
conducting clinical research.”
Not only in its provisions (such as IME and DSH) but
also in its squeezing out of opportunities for cross-subsidies,
the BBA affected the delicate balance upon which federal
payments to AMCs have depended over the years. Different
participants reached different conclusions about the value of
doing this, based on whether they think the cross-subsidies
support excessive payments or result in valued outcomes.

Exploring the Post-BBA Implications for
Hospital-Based Systems
The definition of the Medicare home health benefit is
unclear, while that of the Medicare SNF benefit is clear
and has standards. Participants agreed that the home health
benefit differs significantly from the SNF benefit, which is
well-defined in law, carefully monitored, and subject to
conditions of participation that have been revised over the
years. The home health benefit, on the other hand, is
“fuzzily defined,” difficult to supervise because it takes
place in patients’ homes, and not subject to a comparable
level of standards.

There is disagreement over the effects of
the BBA on discharges from acute-care
settings and on referrals for services.
While 38 percent of the BBA reductions in Medicare
came from hospitals, participants were unsure of the effects
on those institutions. One theory is that the BBA is increasing discharges. Another is that it is resulting in patients’
staying in acute beds longer because of greater difficulty—particularly for more complex patients—in referring
them to BBA-affected post-acute settings. While there is
anecdotal evidence from providers and some studies—for
example, conflicting results from the General Accounting
Office and Center for Health Policy and Research on access
to home health care—the debate continues.

Policymakers and providers alike are
sorting out BBA effects (as well as the
16

ameliorating effects of the BBRA) and the
continued rollout of additional BBA policy
changes over time.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the BBA because
of the transitional implementation of some BBA changes,
provision for shifts in payment systems (in the case of
home health, for instance, from an interim payment system
to a PPS), and amendment of some of the BBA provisions
by the BBRA.

Policymakers and providers also are sorting out BBA-BBRA effects relative to
Medicaid, particularly in terms of the
impact of changes in Medicare on the
Medicaid market.
It was brought out that a reduction in Medicaid payment
rates in some states (such as Michigan)—occurring at the
same time as Medicare BBA changes—complicated provider efforts to adjust. While policymakers have been more
concerned about the impact of changes in welfare law upon
the Medicaid program, they would do well to look at
Medicare-Medicaid interactions, as well as the effects on
dual Medicare-Medicaid eligibles and on persons “on the
edge” (relative to their becoming eligible for Medicaid or of
needing indigent care).

Policymakers and providers additionally
are sorting out BBA-BBRA effects relative
to those that resulted from changes in the
private health marketplace.
Rapid changes in the health marketplace—for example, mergers and acquisitions, managed care fiscal arrangements, and adoption of care management programs—make
it difficult to separate the impacts of legislative and
regulatory changes from those of plan and payer actions.

For organizations that lobbied for
changes to the BBA, the BBRA is just a
down payment.
Providers who participated in the Annapolis conference saw the estimated $16 billion in BBRA Medicare
savings over five years to be retained by the industry as a
first step in reversing BBA provisions. Some of the federal
participants, on the other hand, indicated that, in the words
of one participant, “the feds were rolled.” All of the
hospital systems provided data on the potential impact of
various provisions in the BBA (and the ameliorating

effects of the BBRA). Some federal participants, questioning the methodologies suggested by provider lobbying
groups and the validity of studies conducted by contract
research organizations for such groups, seemed doubtful.
All seemed to agree on the importance of and the need for
getting good predictive and impact data.

While the industry charge that the BBA
has given the wrong message to efficient
and innovative providers draws some
federal adherents, it distresses others.
Provider participants and some of the federal attendees
contended that provisions in the BBA give the wrong
message to providers, particularly efficient ones that are
harder hit than inefficient or new providers because of
baselines and certain other factors. For example, they said
the “caps” on medical rehabilitation services in the BBA
(revised by the BBRA) and the expansion of PPS to postacute services emphasize cost over quality of care. Other
participants, mainly federal, indicated that the BBA
changes bring cost to bear as a positive factor in whether
and how care should be delivered and actually provide
incentives for efficient providers. On a related point, some
providers charged that the BBA is having an adverse
impact on providers’ willingness and capacity to innovate—that providers and plans that play it safe do better
than those that try or adopt new approaches. They cited the
blow to newly thriving rehabilitation firms because of the
physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speechhearing-language pathology provisions in the BBA. They
mentioned health plans’ difficulty with the Medicare+
Choice program, as it was mandated by the BBA. They
brought up prominent progressive AMCs that have
suffered well-publicized setbacks. Other participants
challenged the bases for such claims. They indicated that
the providers’ strategies may have been rash or not thought
out or that the organizations may have been victimized by
market forces unrelated to legislative actions.

In assessing BBA-BBRA as well as market changes, it is important to look at the
significance of the growth of pharmaceuticals.
While pharmaceuticals’ increasing share of the health
care dollar was not related directly to BBA or BBRA
provisions, numerous participants found it worth noting. In
examining various BBA provisions—relative to their
compound effects on hospitals and health plans—various
participants noted the importance of taking pharmaceutical
costs into account. That is, such costs have exacerbated the

impact on facilities and therefore should be given attention
in any future determinations policymakers make relative to
the delivery and payment of health services.

The BBA forged some new federal-state
linkages that bear examination and evaluation.
This point received little discussion and may, in fact,
belong to the conference’s research agenda. Nonetheless,
it highlighted the growing influence of Medicaid on the
managed care marketplace, the Child Health Insurance
Program that was enacted by the BBA, the impact of
welfare changes, the state and regional differences in
health plan acceptance of Medicare+Choice, the failure of
provider-sponsored organizations as authorized by the
BBA, and other initiatives.

Aligning Public and Private Incentives in
Delivery and Payment of Health Services

There are various views of the process of
change, as initiated by the BBA: (a)
change does not happen until it has to, (b)
change is occurring in every direction (for
example, inpatient, outpatient, and postacute), (c) change is very difficult to cope
with, and (d) change can force a reevaluation of operational and managerial practice, leading to a stronger organization.
Participants expressed these concepts of change
during the two-day Annapolis conference. Overall, they
implied that policymakers seem to be pushing change and
providers and plans are resisting it. Moreover, in the view
of some, the current unrest over the sweeping BBA
legislation is due to the field’s experiencing too many
changes (for example, the fallout of merger and consolidation activity, hospital purchase of physician practices, and
heightened government anti-fraud and -abuse initiatives).

Policymakers are concerned about the
impact of multiple changes (for example,
in Medicare, Medicaid, welfare, and antifraud and -abuse initiatives) as well as
about their combined effects upon providers and patients.
A lot of policy changes occurred around the same
time, as Congress and the president strove to reduce health
care outlays in Medicare and Medicaid and provide a
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transition for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) recipients to enter workfare programs and cut the
AFDC-Medicaid link. Moreover, with stepped up funds,
the DHHS inspector general, in coordination with the
Department of Justice, intensified efforts to attack fraud
and abuse in federal health programs. The multiple
program changes, combined with the anti-fraud and -abuse
efforts (and their chilling effect), have had a strong impact
upon providers and the patients they serve.

A complex data problem is apparent: the
BBA projections demonstrate difficulty in
making estimates and projections, in
sorting out costs and revenues, and in
taking into account the interaction of
federal and state programs.
While some participants pointed to inadequate data
and others to wrong data, all agreed that lack of accurate
data is a major shortfall in understanding the BBA and is
a major pitfall in health policy. “There’s no point at which
data are stable,” one participant said, noting the absence of
realistic baselines upon which determinations can be made.
Another participant stressed the importance of independent
data, contending that studies contracted for by interest
groups tend to be biased. Still another indicated that
“pulling numbers out of the air is scary”—that more needs
to be done to get good data and to facilitate judgments
about connections and interactions.

Regional differences get too little attention
in the formulation and implementation of
Medicare policy.
Various participants—from both the provider and the
federal sectors—underlined the importance of regional
differences in the delivery of health services and the need
for recognition of these differences in payment policy.
They stressed that BBA-BBRA provisions are affecting
different parts of the country unevenly, due to practice
patterns, demographics, and other factors. While health
plan acceptance (or the lack thereof) of Medicare+Choice
may be the most obvious example, the inclusion of outpatient services in PPS and the challenges of providing home
health services drew attention as well. A key question was
how to differentiate the unique needs of each market.
Another was whether or not the federal government should
adopt such a strategy at all. For instance, when do Medicare reimbursement policies seriously jeopardize access to
care for beneficiaries and under what circumstances should
the Medicare program consider modifying its reimbursement policies in certain markets? Another was how to
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analyze the impact on payment rates of federal and state
interactions.

A major policy question is whether or not
there should be a common denominator
for the public contributions to AMC service, teaching, and research missions—if
the policy goal should be to seek an average in the level of facilities, provision of
care, training of students, and conduct of
research.
This question arose during discussion of the UW AMC
case study and focused on the use of federal government
resources to help support AMCs. Given a limited pot of
health service, health professions education, and research
dollars, should the funding be divided among various
institutions or targeted to those that have demonstrated the
best quality or highest success? In other words, with certain
geographic and other considerations, should the center-ofexcellence concept apply to AMCs? Should an AMC be
rewarded for drawing resources from other public as well as
private sources, offering top-notch clinical and educational
services as well as pursuing various lines of research, and
otherwise acting like “the best”? Or does that put it in a “nowin” position as far as federal policymakers are concerned?
Should National Institutes of Health funds, for instance, be
concentrated among a small percentage of AMCs, as they are
now, or spread out more equally among those that have
research programs? All of this centers on the question of
“averaging” in the distribution of federal funds, inviting
future debate.

HCFA needs to undertake aggressive and
proactive development and monitoring
activity, using diverse indicators, to determine the area impacts of its policies.
Because the traditional data sources are unreliable or
lag behind developments in the field, one participant said
that HCFA is trying new outlets and is seeking others. For
example, by looking at employment trends in the industry,
carrier and fiscal intermediary daily reports on providers,
regional office information, and other data, HCFA might
be able to get a better idea of the effects of its policies on
providers and plans. As private data resources dwindle (for
example, the American Hospital Association has dropped
its monthly panel survey of community hospitals and the
American Medical Association is cutting back on its data
initiatives), participants indicated that HCFA needs to do
more in developing existing data sources and creating new
monitoring mechanisms.

The BBA and BBRA renewed the debate
about medical education issues, such as
which providers should be recognized,
whether there should be a proxy for case
mix and severity of illness, and how explicit definitions should be relative to
social goods.
Renewing an old debate about the federal role in
medical education, participants looked at whether patient
services should be subsidized by medical education payments. They also explored whether the IME is an appropriate
proxy for teaching hospitals’ greater case mix of complex
patients requiring more intensity of care, and what the
tradeoffs (relative to safety-net patients) are between the IME
and DSH adjustments. For example, the same institutions
commonly have received both adjustments, with the residents upon which the IME formula is based tending to be the
providers of services to the low-income patients upon which
the Medicare DSH adjustment is defined.

The BBA and BBRA also highlighted the
need for appropriate measures of risk
adjustment, severity of illness, and intensity of services and the usefulness of morbidity, co-morbidity, and mortality data in
developing policy, devising payment strategies, and assessing quality of care.
Participants acknowledged that the health industry is
still grappling with the need for adequate measures to
differentiate among providers and patients and that it is still
arguing about the effectiveness of the measures that it has.

Growth of the uninsured needs to be taken
into account in aligning and assessing
incentives for delivery and payment of
services for publicly (and privately) insured patients.
With the uninsured having reached 44 million persons
in a robust economy, a few participants raised the subject
of the role of social goods in health policy. HFHS President Warden addressed the cumulative effects of reductions in DSH payments, slim hospital margins, and other
factors on community-based programs, health promotion
and preventive care, AIDS and other specialty clinics,
innovations in long-term care, and other programs. Calling
the growth in uninsured “a ticking time bomb,” he and
others raised the question of what happens if the economy
declines.

The BBA has forced providers to pay
closer attention to their management and
business practices.
Impelled by provisions in the BBA to take a prospective
position relative to the continuum of services they provide,
providers have had to focus on the business aspects of
delivery and payment. In other words, as home health, SNF,
rehabilitation, and hospital outpatient PPS strategies are
added, providers have to think PPS rather than cost-based
reimbursement. As providers compete based on pricing
systems—indeed, different pricing systems—their degree of
acumen becomes even more important. According to one
provider, as a result, “patient satisfaction ratings are higher
than they have ever been. We’ll come out stronger as an
organization. But it has been painful.”

The BBA-BBRA changes raise workforce
issues, such as the use and shortage of
nursing and service personnel in health
care settings and the roles of formal versus informal caregivers.
Participants noted that health industry studies document
a shortage of both licensed registered and practical nurses
and other personnel and a decline in those being trained. For
example, the average age of nurses is over 40, and the vast
majority of nurses are women with growing employment
opportunities in this strong economy that offer more income
and less strain. Some participants blamed the BBA for
increasing the stress on workers in already over-stressed
health care organizations, especially hospitals. Providers on
the site visits and at the Annapolis conference complained
most about the problem of getting lower-income workers,
those who do service jobs in both acute and post-acute
settings. This gave rise to discussions of caregiving, particularly in terms of training family members (informal caregivers) to do some of the housekeeping and patient care tasks
previously done by aides and support personnel.

While continuity of care is given a lot of
lip service, it is not a reality.
Although continuity of care seems to have become a
“buzz term,” it means little, participants concluded. In the
fragmented U.S. system, it remains a goal yet to be defined
and reached. For instance, some participants assumed that
it means the range of services, from preventive and
primary through quaternary, offered by paid providers.
Others implied that it means the scope of services, from
preventive through palliative, provided by both formal
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health care workers and informal caregivers. However, in
the review of the UW case study, it was pointed out that
UW is one of six schools in the nation with a required
chronic-care clerkship. UW officials contended that its
diverse offerings provide medical students ample exposure
to the full continuum of services.

Ultimately, revisiting the BBA and BBRA
comes down to what kind of system public
policy people can negotiate with providers
and plans in order to provide quality care.
Quality of care was a byword of the Annapolis
conference rather than a major theme. While it came up
often relative to the three systems’ efforts to serve their
patients, adverse effects due to BBA cutbacks, and the
difficulty of assessing the delivery of services in various
settings, no conclusions were reached. Federal and provider participants seemed to look to public-private negotiations to ascertain what services consumers want and how
they can be delivered and financed.

20

A Research Agenda

















To explore federal agencies’ needs for data and to
estimate the funding they would need in order to
obtain them.
To gain a better understanding of the interface between AMCs and the private health marketplace.
To examine regional differences in home health care
delivery in order to better understand “appropriate”
home health services for various conditions.
To make acute-care length-of-stay comparisons preBBA and post-BBA.
To study trends (positive or negative) in horizontal
and vertical integration of health systems.
To examine tax-based funding of health services.
To look at the interactions between Medicaid and
Medicare relative to payment.
To explore the future of Medicare funding.
To examine ways of funding GME.
To revisit the policy of devolution of Medicaid to the
states.
To look at ways of supporting health systems where
innovation is taking place and the safety net is assured.
To consider the growing problem of the uninsured.
In Medicare payments, to develop ways of accounting
for acuity of illness and intensity of services.
In both entitlement and appropriated spending (with
particular reference to AMCs’ service, education, and
research missions), to look at the concept of “averaging” versus promotion of centers of excellence.
To conduct research on formal versus informal caregiving along a care continuum relative to both services
and payment (or the lack thereof).
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Selected Comments from
Annapolis Participants
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“It is clear from the three cases and the views of the
Beltway folks that there is a huge disconnect between
reality and D.C. We need to bridge this gap. Additionally, there is an amazing lack of trust between the two
parties. The people providing health care question the
D.C. ethics and motives, while the D.C. folks don’t
believe (to the point of pushing fraud and abuse
actions) the people providing health care.”
“[We need to look at] the outcome consequences for
the BBA and other federal policy changes.”
“[There needs to be follow-up on] measures, data on
interactions, and more.”
“Try to continue the case study approach. It forces
federal staff to justify thinking with real applications.
Similarly, political interventions would not be needed if
federal policy were more directed by actual examples.”
“Is there a way to have the same type of discussion with
a full standing of providers? (For example, home health
agencies, physician groups, hospitals—providers from
the same market, working together or not working
together.)”
“After the actual issues are distilled out from the
discussions, further programming [should] attempt to
drill down to obtain a better understanding of the
contributing factors. For example, what makes certain
systems efficient? What is the character of the actual
impact on ‘safety net’ providers from the BBA? Can
incentives be tailored to geographic areas?”
“What are the effects of market segmentation? Rural,
handle with care.”
“East Coast is always a problem for West Coast people.”
“Felt we made progress in breaking through prejudices
and policy biases derived from 30,000-feet analysis.”
“Should have invited a ‘failed’ system leader, for
example, purchased hospital in Hampton [Roads]/
Richmond, Detroit Medical Center [to balance] Henry
Ford, and Providence in Seattle.”
“The disparate pieces of information are difficult to
pull together to inform my work, but that is probably
the nature of the beast, why this work is so interesting
and hard.”
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